Dumping in the Mountains: Insurers Pay Defense, Not Cleanup, Costs in Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co. by Cachey, Diana A.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 69 Issue 2 Article 6 
February 2021 
Dumping in the Mountains: Insurers Pay Defense, Not Cleanup, 
Costs in Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co. 
Diana A. Cachey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Diana A. Cachey, Dumping in the Mountains: Insurers Pay Defense, Not Cleanup, Costs in Hecla Mining 
Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 69 Denv. U. L. Rev. 255 (1992). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
DUMPING IN THE MOUNTAINS: INSURERS PAY DEFENSE, NOT
CLEANUP, COSTS IN HECLA MINING Co. V. NEw
HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE CO.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1800s, Colorado's vast natural resources have lured
prospectors and mining companies' to the area's mountainous regions.
Mining activity increased as state and federal legislatures enacted laws to
promote exploitation of minerals.2 In return, the mining industry pro-
duced billions of dollars in revenue for the state's coffers. Policies that
promote industry, however, have traditionally conflicted with a growing
public policy concern-the need to protect the environment. Thus, leg-
islative support of the mining industry often clashes with the public de-
sire to safeguard the environment, particularly in Colorado's wilderness
areas. To balance these conflicting interests, the Colorado legislature
enacted laws that both encouraged and restricted mining activities.
3
In Heda Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.,4 the Colorado
Supreme Court favored the mining company's interests in a declaratory
judgment action. The court held the insurance company had a duty to
defend Hecla Mining Co. in a lawsuit filed under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), to which the original named defendants joined Hecla. 5 The
CERCLA pollution damages resulted in part from Hecla's continuous
discharges into an improperly maintained mining tunnel. Hecla's insur-
ance policies attempted to exclude coverage for pollution that was not
"sudden and accidental."
1. The focus of this Comment is the mining industry. Although the mining industry
is not the only industry producing hazardous wastes from its business activities, nor neces-
sarily is it the primary offender, a detailed analysis of other industries is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
2. The most recent example of Colorado legislative promotion of mineral exploita-
tion is found in the Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 34-32-
101 to 125 (1984 & Supp. 1991). See also Colorado Surface Coal Mining Reclamation Act,
CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 34-33-101 to 137 (1984 & Supp. 1991). Similar federal legislation
includes the Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (1988) and the Mining Law of 1920,
30 U.S.C. §§ 181-187 (1988).
3. The Colorado Court of Appeals ruled against Hecla by interpreting the Colorado
Mined Land Reclamation Act (Act) to express an intent to "aid in the protection of wildlife
and aquatic resources.., and promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the peo-
ple of this state." New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 791 P.2d 1154, 1157
(Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (citing CoLo. REV. STAT. § 34-32-102 (1984)). The Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that the Act provided constructive notice to mine operators that mining
could cause environmental damage. Id.
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this argument: "The court of appeals reason-
ing is in error.... Contrary to the court of appeals analysis, the Mined Land Act proclaims
that mining is a necessary and proper activity and should be promoted by the state of
Colorado." Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991).
4. 811 P.2d at 1083.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9607 (1983 & Supp. 1990).
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The Hecla dispute began in 1983, when the State of Colorado filed
suit against Asarco Resurrection Mining Co. and Res-Asarco Joint Ven-
ture in federal district court under CERCLA. 6 In January 1985, Asarco
joined Hecla and over 200 individuals and companies 7 seeking contribu-
tion for the cleanup costs. The third-party complaint against Hecla led
to the present controversy regarding whether New Hampshire Insur-
ance (NH) and Industrial Indemnity (Industrial) had a duty to defend
Hecla in Colorado's CERCLA lawsuit8 under a series of comprehensive
general liability (CGL) insurance policies, which contained clauses ex-
cluding pollution damages.
The Colorado Supreme Court held the allegations in the CERCLA
complaint did not fall within the pollution exclusion clause 9 and, there-
fore, the insurers had a duty to defend.1 0 The Hecla decision: (1)
broadly construed standard language in the CGL, 11 (2) held the policy
exclusion clauses were inapplicable to the insurers' duty to defend a
CERCLA lawsuit, 12 and (3) changed established procedure in Colorado
insurance law. The court also stated insurers should litigate declaratory
judgment actions after defending insureds in underlying CERCLA ac-
tions. The court cited case law and rules of contract interpretation to
support its policy-based decision that the Colorado Mined Land Recla-
mation Act' 3 proclaimed mining "a necessary and proper activity (that)
should be promoted by the state of Colorado." 14 This Comment fo-
cuses on whether the Hecla decision properly resolved either the insur-
ance contract dispute or the conflict between mining and environmental
protection and cleanup.
This Comment briefly summarizes the evolution of the standard
CGL insurance policies in environmental litigation. It then reviews the
drafting history of the pollution exclusion clause and summarizes case
law construing policy language. Finally, this Comment criticizes the
Hecla holding because the precedent may potentially increase litigation
and create incentives to pollute. This Comment also argues that by find-
ing a broad duty to defend against a CERCLA complaint, 15 the Hecla
court may have fallen short of the goal to promote mining for two rea-
sons: environmental insurance costs may now escalate and mining com-
panies may still be denied coverage in subsequent declaratory judgment
actions.
6. See Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985)
7. Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1085.
8. The federal government has also filed suit against Hecla and other mining compa-
nies. United States v. Apache Energy & Minerals Co., No. 86-C-1675 (D. Colo. 1986).
The duty to defend the federal lawsuit is not at issue in this declaratory judgment action.
9. Hecla, 811 P.2d 1088.
10. Id. at 1092.
11. Id. at 1088, 1092.
12. Id. at 1092.
13. See supra note 3.
14. Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1088.
15. See id. at 1088-89.
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II. CERCLA: THE GOVERNMENT'S CLAIM AGAINST POLLUTERS
Congress tried to ameliorate years of contaminating industrial re-
leases into the environment by passing CERCLA in 1980.16 The basic
principle behind CERCLA is to place responsibility for cleanup on the
polluters while furnishing money for cleanup' 7 and study of contami-
nated federal sites. 18 CERCLA identifies several broad categories of po-
tentially responsible parties (PRPs) who may be liable for cleanup of
hazardous chemical contamination. PRPs are any past and present own-
ers of contaminated property, operators of contaminated facilities, per-
sons transporting hazardous materials to the property or arranging for
treatment and disposal, or others accepting the substances for transport
to a contaminated site.1 9 The Environmental Protection Agency or any
person, including a state's attorney general, may request an injunction
against PRPs,20 who may be strictly liable for cleanup costs of the con-
taminated site.2
1
Broadly construing CERCLA liability, courts apply retroactive lia-
bility for "contamination caused before the effective date"2 2 of CER-
CLA and permit joint and several liability to apply to "one or a few PRPs
to recover all of the cleanup costs."' 23 As another means of extending
16. Pub. L. No. 96-510,94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988 & Supp. 11989)). Six years after its enactment CERCLA was significantly revised by
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). See Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1613.
The focus of this Comment is CERCLA. Congress has enacted many other laws to
protect the environment by imposing financial liability on polluters. See, e.g., Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251-1376 (1988 &
Supp. 11989); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1988). A
discussion of the use of the Hecla holding as precedent for future insurance litigation
under these other statutes is beyond the scope of this Note, but case law can be read to
support an argument analogizing the statutes. See, e.g., Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio
Casualty Ins. Co., 289 N.E.2d 360 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972) (pollution exclusion clause in
RCRA based suit did not exclude coverage when insured intended the release of pollu-
tants but not the resulting damage).
17. Superfund, a federal trust fund created by CERCLA, pays for government lawsuits
against responsible parties in order to recover cleanup costs which are then deposited
back into the fund. FREDERICK R. ANDERSON et. al. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND
.PoucY 614-15 (2d ed. 1990). Remedial costs for short-term emergency responses and
removal costs for long-term deanup are both recoverable by the EPA under CERCLA. Id.
A state may take remedial action only by entering into a cooperative agreement with EPA
to pay 10 percent of the cleanup cost. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (1988). The Department of
Justice may bring suit whenever there is an "imminent and substantial endangerment to
the public health or welfare or the environment." lId § 9606(a) (1988).
18. Id. § 9604(b)(1) (1988).
19. Id. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
20. See id. § 9606(a). See also id. § 9601(32).
21. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(a)-(d). Removal and remedial costs at a single hazardous waste
site averages between 30 to 50 million dollars. EPA estimates the total liability for 19,000
sites nationwide could total over 100 billion dollars. Stephanie E. Pochop,Jones Truck Lines
v. Transport Insurance Co.: More Fuel for the Heated Debate Over insurance Coverage for CERCLA
Clean Up Costs, 35 S.D. L. REV. 298 (1990).
22. Richard L. Griffith, The Impact of CERCLA Liability on Real Property Transactions, 17
COLO. LAW. 471 (1988) (citing United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.,
810 F.2d 726, 734 (8th Cir. 1986)).
23. Id. at 471 (citing United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio
1983)).
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liability for pollution damages, courts liberally interpret "owner" and
"operator" in determining which parties are liable for contaminated
property.24 CERCLA provides only a few defenses, such as the "inno-
cent purchaser" defense 25 and qualification for de minimis settlement.
26
The Hecla dispute provides a typical fact scenario for a CERCLA lawsuit
because Congress intended to remedy situations such as the California
Gulch contamination when it enacted CERCLA.
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL COVERAGE ISSUES
Insurance transfers, spreads and allocates risks27 from a single busi-
ness to a group of businesses with premium costs directly reflecting a
business operation's level of risk.28 When the parties enter into an in-
surance contract, an insurance company assumes part of the business
risk and the insurance proceeds become a resource that enables contin-
ued business operations "without the outlay of internal capital or assets
to reach a level of self-insurability." 2 9 Insurance provides a method for
businesses to survive financial losses from victim compensation or pollu-
tion cleanup, and is most efficient when the losses are statistically pre-
dictable within an industry, but are not pervasive.30 Environmental
protection statutes complicate this risk allocation and calculation be-
cause the liability, which may be ultimately imposed, is usually unfore-
seeable when most insurance policies are written. 3 1 For example,
"[n]either insured nor insurer anticipated the impact of CERCLA,
SARA or SUPERFUND" before the laws were passed. 32 Insurers reluc-
tantly insured for environmental damage due to the uncertainties in cal-
culating costs associated with cleanup.33 Although insurers redrafted
the policies several times to accommodate the new environmental risks,
"[u]ncertainty has plagued the insurance industry at each stage because
courts have interpreted policy language inconsistently and imprecisely.
24. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (liability found
against present owners of site whose actions did not contribute to contamination); United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (lenders holding
title for four years who foreclosed on contaminated property were liable); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1987) (corporate officers who were
stockholders responsible for hazardous waste disposal at the property were liable under
CERCLA); United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1353 (D.N.M. 1984)
(where lessee caused contamination, owner and lessor of site held liable). Griffith, supra
note 22, at 471-73 n.9-16.
25. This defense is available only when a third-party's act or omission caused the con-
tamination and the PRP safeguarded against any such acts that were foreseeable. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
26. IdM § 9622.
27. M. Jane Meridian, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damages, in 3 THE LAW OF
DISTRESSED REL ESTATE, 30A-1, 30A-6 (Baxter Dunaway ed., 1990).
28. Id. at 30A-6 (citing Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of
Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 942, 946 (1988)).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 30A-7.
32. Id.
33. Fred Feinstein & Carolyn Hesse, C532 ALI-ABA 1403, 1417 (1990).
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Consequently, insurers have been left to speculate as to their future
liabilities."
3 4
A. The Evolution of the Pollution Exclusion Clause
The drafting history of insurance policies for pollution-related dam-
ages reveals several attempts by insurers to clarify contract intent and
establish certainty in risk calculations, after courts inconsistently con-
strued contract language and expanded coverage liability. In early envi-
ronmental litigation, courts held CGLs covered pollution "damages,"
which were not explicitly enumerated in the policies. When insurers re-
vised policies to provide coverage only for pollution damages that were
accidents and occurrences, courts again reinterpreted the contract lan-
guage to expand coverage. Eventually, these largely unsuccessful at-
tempts at clarifying coverage intent forced insurers to specifically
exclude pollution damages from coverage.
1. Are Pollution Damages Covered?
Initially, courts shifted pollution clean-up costs from polluters to
insurance companies by construing "damages" in general CGL policies
to encompass all pollution-related damages.3 5 Courts easily rational-
ized this cost-shifting because the word "comprehensive" in the title of
CGLs implied that total coverage was provided.3 6 Further, the purpose
of the policies was to protect the insured against liability from third-
party damages and to defend the insured against bodily injury and prop-
erty damage claims.3 7 It followed that insureds bought CGLs in order
to gain broad protection against personal injury and property damage
resulting from pollution caused by regular business activities. 38 CGL
policies exclude first-party damages because other insurance policies
cover these losses3 9 (e.g., automobile no-fault insurance covers first-
party damages). 4O Nonetheless, many commentators argue insurers
never intended to cover pollution damages that resulted from risks the
34. E.Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking Glass,
74 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1241 (1986).
35. With heightened public awareness of environmental problems, pollution was at-
tacked in the courthouse when "the public 'turned to the courts for the environmental
protection that [it] did not always obtain through legislative bodies, administrative agen-
cies, or political pressures.'" Id. at 1237 n.2 (quoting Robert S. Soderstrom, The Role of
Insurance in Environmental Litigation, 11 FORUM 762 (1976)).
36. Maria Jo Aspinwall, Note, The Applicability of General Liability Insurance to Hazardous
Waste Disposal, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 757 (1984).
37. Robert D. Chesler et. al. Patterns of Judicial Interpretation of Insurance Coverage for
Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18 RUTGERS LJ. 9, 14 (1986).
38. Id
39. Id. at 14-15.
40. Id. at 15. Some policy coverage for pollution damages is available under Environ-
mental Impairment Liability policies, but these have yet to be judicially interpreted. See
Jonathan C. Averback, Comment, Comparing the Old and New Pollution Exclusion Clauses in
General Liability Insurance Policies: New Language Same Results?, 14 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV.
601, 602 (1987) (citing H.G. Sparrow, Hazardous Waste Insurance Coverage: Unexpected Past,
Uncertain Future, 64 MICH. B.J. 169, 171-73 (1985)).
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
insured knew of or intentionally assumed.4 1
Additionally, public policy disfavored insuring intentional behav-
ior.4 2 When CERCLA was passed, making PRPs strictly liable, insur-
ance liability quickly escalated despite drafting intent. The new policy to
fund cleanups replaced the former public policy not to insure for inten-
tional behavior. This judicial expansion of coverage to include pollu-
tion-related damages led insurance companies to revise the policies and
provide coverage only for pollution damages resulting from "accidents"
and then later, for strictly-defined "occurrences." Each change of policy
language provoked a fierce round of litigation between contracting par-
ties. Courts consistently held in favor of PRPs in order to help fund
cleanups under both the accident-based and occurrence-based policies.
2. Accident-Based Pollution Insurance Policies
Before 1966, CGL policies covered only accidental pollution dam-
ages. Referred to as accident-based policies, the name originated from
the operative clause: "To pay, on behalf of insured, all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of...
destruction of property . . .caused by accident." 43 What "accident"
meant to insurers was clear,4 4 but the companies did not define the term
in the policies so courts interpreted the seeming ambiguity. 45 Courts
held "accident" meant a variety of things, from unforeseeable 46 to un-
41.- See, e.g., Chesler, supra note 37, at 15-16; see also Soderstrom, supra note 35, at 767;
Sheldon Hurwitz & Dan D. Kohane, The Love Canal - Insurance Coverage for Environmental
Accidents, 50 INS. COUNS.J. 378 (1983).
42. It would be ludicrous to expect an insurance company to pay for damages that an
insured intentionally inflicted upon an innocent victim. For example, few would contend
that a grocery store owner who intentionally shoots a customer should collect from his
store insurance policy for the damages.
43. Chesler, supra note 35, at 15.
44. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1241 n.24 (citing Leslie, Automobile and General Liabil-
ity Insurance, 70 A.B.A. SEC. INs. NEGL. & COMPENS'N L. 84-85 (1962) (insurers made public
their intent)).
45. See Sam P. Rynearson, Exclusion of Expected or Intended Personal Injury or Property Dam-
age Under the Occurrence Definition of the Standard Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 19 Fo-
RUM 513, 515-24 (1984).
46. E.g., American Casualty Co. v. Minnesota Farm Bureau Serv. Co., 270 F.2d 686,
691-92 (8th Cir. 1959) (damages occurring over more than six years from fertilizer manu-
facturing not covered because they were not unforeseeable or unexpected); Thomason v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 248 F.2d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 1957) (damages caused by
mistake or error excluded from coverage); Hutchinson Water Co. v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 250 F.2d 892, 893-94 (10th Cir. 1957) (insured's failure to maintain sufficient
pressure in system excluded coverage for damages because they were the natural and
probable consequence of the acts); Kuckenberg v. Hartford Accident Indem. Co., 226 F.2d
225, 226 (9th Cir. 1955) (damages were not accidental because they were the normal and
probable consequence of building the road); Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burch, 187
N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962) (foreseeable and natural and ordinary consequences of
an act are excluded from coverage); Harleysville Mut. Casualty Co. v. Harris & Brooks,
Inc., 235 A.2d 556, 559 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967) (where it is foreseeable damage would
occur from smoke and soot, actor's conduct in burning trees was not an accident); Foxley
& Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 277 N.W.2d 686, 688 (Neb. 1979) (damages
that were the natural result of the policyholder's deliberate acts were not covered under
accident-based policy); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Briscoe, 239 P.2d 754, 758
(Okla. 1951) (damage from cement dust caused by policyholder's voluntary acts and negli-
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expected and unintended.4 7 A negligent act could also be considered
an accident4 8 and still be covered 49 because the courts adopted a loss/
act distinction. As long as the insured did not expect or intend the ulti-
mate loss,50 pollution resulting from negligent acts were covered in
some jurisdictions.5" Courts "may have taken the distinction too far"
52
by holding accidental pollution could flow from an intentional act.
In short, the fragmented judicial treatment of environmentally
related damage under accident-based policies left the insurer
unable to predict its potential liability. While the insurers have
gence were not accidental); Town ofTieton v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 380 P.2d 127, 130-
31 (Wash. 1963) (sewage pollution of well is expected and foreseeable).
47. Courts that held damages were included in coverage generally held that the loss,
not the act, was unexpected. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Martin Bros. Container
& Timber Prods. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 145, 149-50 (D. Or. 1966) (unanticipated result of
expected act was "unexpected" and thus covered); Moffat v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins.
Co., 238 F. Supp. 165, 172 (M.D. Pa. 1964) (foreseeability of damage does not exclude
coverage); City of Myrtle Point v. Pacific Indem. Co., 233 F. Supp. 193, 197-98 (D. Or.
1963) (expected malfunction of sewage plant not excluded from coverage); Employers Ins.
Co. v. Rives, 87 So. 2d 653, 655-58 (Ala. 1955) (accident defined as chance happening is
not mere negligence and is not excluded); Moore v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 295 P.2d 154,
156-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (unexpected and unforeseen damage from laundromat was
accidental); Travelers v. Humming Bird Coal Co., 371 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Ky. 1963) (unex-
pected slippage of earth at strip mine is accidental despite foreseeability); White v. Smith,
440 S.W.2d 497, 507-08 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (unintended resulting damage from inten-
tional acts were covered); City of Kimball v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 206 N.W.2d
632, 634-37 (Neb. 1973) (damage caused by pollution of groundwater from insured city's
lagoon was covered because it was unexpected); Lancaster Area Refuse Auth. v. Trans-
america Ins. Co., 437 Pa. 493, 496, 263 A.2d 368, 369 (1970) (damages caused by negli-
gence may still be accidental), rev ', 251 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969); Taylor v. Imperial
Casualty & Indem. Co., 144 N.W.2d 856, 859 (S.D. 1966) (damages from negligent acts
were covered because "the unintended consequences were caused by accident").
48. See, e.g., Employers Ins. Co. v. Rives, 87 So. 2d 653, 656 (Ala. 1955) (accident
means happening by chance or unexpectedly and does not exclude negligence); Minkov v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 149 A.2d 260, 263 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959) (mere fact that
damage was caused by negligence in not a bar to coverage); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fred M.
Simmons Inc., 138 S.E.2d 512, 515 (N.C. 1964) (foreseeability of damage does not bar
recovery for negligence when it would render policy worthless to insured). But see Gray v.
State Dep't of Highways, 191 So. 2d 802, 815 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (to determine whether
something was an accident requires a determination whether the person to whom the in-
jury expected foresaw the damage), modified, 202 So. 2d 24 (La. 1969).
49. Courts wrestled with whether negligent conduct was included in coverage for acci-
dental pollution since "accident" normally implies foreseeability is absent. Rynearson,
supra note 45, at 515. The distinction between negligence and accident in tort law has
been the lack of fault in accidents. Id. Compare Lancaster Area Refuse Auth. v. Transamer-
ica Ins. Co., 263 A.2d 368, 369 (Pa. 1970) (negligent harm may still be caused by accident)
and Iowa Mut. v. Fred M. Simmons Inc., 138 S.E.2d 512, 515 (N.C. 1964) (to define "acci-
dent" as negligence makes the policy worthless to the insured) with City of Carter Lake v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1058 (8th Cir. 1979) (coverage for some negli-
gent acts does not necessarily extend to all negligent acts).
50. White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497, 507 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (intended acts and
intended results are very different). But see Kuckenberg v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 226 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1955) (damages in excess of that forseen does not make
an incident an "accident"); Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Gerrits, 65 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla.
1953) (where reliance on false information caused damages, they were not accidental be-
cause they were a natural and probable consequence).
51. Rynearson, supra note 45, at 517 (citing Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 133
N.E.2d 432, 433 (N.Y. 1921) (accidental injuries are determined for insurance purposes by
the results rather than by the causes)).
52. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1244-45.
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
long since abandoned accident-based coverage, this spectre of
the 'accident' has continued to haunt the insurance policy in
each of its subsequent forms.
5 3
3. The Occurrence Limitation
In 1966, insurance companies responded to inconsistent judicial
construction, and the needs of industry to obtain more coverage,5 4 by
drafting new policies. 55 Referred to as occurrence-based, the new poli-
cies covered pollution damages caused by "an accident, including con-
tinuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results, during the
policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured."'56 Pollution damage from
gradual loss might be covered, 57 but coverage was excluded for clients
who flagrantly endangered public health,5 8 knowingly polluted5 9 or as-
sumed the risks as costs of doing business. 60 Courts failed to recognize
the insurers' intent to achieve clarity and instead focused on the "intent
to expand coverage." 6 1 Consequently, more judicial inconsistency fol-
lowed from these new occurrence-based policies. First, the foreseeabil-
ity of damages clouded court decisions in manyjurisdictions. Confusion
resulted because some courts read "expected" to mean a "substantial
probability" 6 2 damage would occur, while other courts precluded cover-
53. Id. at 1246.
54. In an effort to clarify and expand the scope of coverage under the CGL pol-
icy, the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters (NBCU) and the Mutual Insur-
ance Rating Bureau (MIRB) completely revised the standard-form policy in 1966
and dropped the phrase caused by accident from the coverage provisions of the
policy.
Carl A. Salisbury, Pollution Liability Insurance Coverage, The Standard-Form Pollution Exclusion,
and the Insurance Industry: A Case Study in Collective Amnesia (citing American Home Products,
565 F. Supp. 1485, 1501 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
55. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1246.
56. Rynearson, supra note 45, at 513 (citing ROWLAND H. LONG, 4 THE LAW OF IABIL-
rry INSURANCE 29 App. & 53 App. (1981)).
57. The NBCU explained its intent in drafting the occurrence-based policy: "[Ilt is no
longer necessary that the event causing the injury be sudden in character. In most cases
the injury will be simultaneous with exposure. However, in some other cases, injuries will
take place over a long period of time before they become manifest." Malcom B. Rosow &
Arthur J. Liederman, An Overview to the Interpretative Problems of "Occurrence" in Comprehensive
General Liability Insurance, 16 FORUM 1148, 1151 (1981) (quoting Nachman, The New Policy
Provisions for General Liability Insurance, 18 THE ANNALS 3, 197 (1965)).
58. Soderstrom, supra note 35, at 764-65 (there should be no coverage for damages
resulting from an insured's business operations which are knowingly in violation of envi-
ronmental statutes and where the insured has failed to remedy such defects).
59. Robert M. Tyler & ToddJ. Wilcox, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: Problems in Interpreta-
tion and Application Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 17 IDAHO L. REv. 497, 500
n.22 (1981) (insurers did not intend to cover clients who intentionally polluted, further,
"occurrence" definition expressly excludes coverage for damages resulting from such
behavior).
60. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW BASIc TEXT 297-98 (1971) (Regular expenses of doing
business are excluded from insurance coverage because liability policies do not cover
highly expectable losses. Pollution damages may be such regularly occurring expenses
that they are costs of doing business, rather than risks to be insured.).
61. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1248.
62. Id. at 1249 (citing City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d
1052, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1979)).
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age for any forseeable loss. 6 3 Second, the word "accident" in the defini-
tion of "occurrence" caused further confusion. 64 Courts followed the
same loss/act distinction methodology used in interpreting accident-
based policies to distinguish between "intentional losses caused by the
insured's intentional acts and unexpected or unintended losses caused
by the insured's intentional acts."' 65 Pollution damages from willful dis-
charges were once again covered if the loss was neither expected nor
intended. Continued judicial expansion of coverage and the subsequent
increased litigation led to the insurance industry's final drafting re-
sponse-the pollution exclusion clause.
6 6
B. Judicial Construction of the Pollution Exclusion Clause
In 1973, insurers again revised policies to add exclusionary clauses,
which covered only pollution damages from occurrences that were "sud-
den and accidental." 6 7 Since occurrence-based policies could extend
pollution coverage to most situations, insurers added a clause to exclude
damages arising from regular, continuous business practices. 68 Even if
a polluter claimed it did not expect a loss, the policies would not cover
damage if it knowingly polluted or if discharges of pollutants continued
over time. 69 Insurers felt public policy supported their decision because
industry would have an incentive to become environmentally efficient if
coverage was denied.70 Unfortunately, the companies chose to draft the
exclusion* clauses with the same "accident" language that caused so
much confusion in the earlier drafts.
That unfortunate language, along with the incorrigible judicial
will to compensate blameless victims, plunged the pollution ex-
clusion further into ambiguity and uncertainty than either of its
63. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1249 (citing City of Wilmington v. Pigott, 307
S.E.2d 857, 859 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (an "accident" is that which happens fortuitously
and is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen)).
64. See James A. Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 15 Fo-
RUM 551, 559 (1980) (courts have established five diverse tests to define "occurrence":
effect, causation, time and space, operative hazard and popular meaning); Rynearson,
supra note 45, at 518-21 (reviewing split among courts regarding interpretation of "acci-
dent" in the occurrence limitation).
65. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1250 (citing Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Casualty
Ins. Co., 289 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972) (damages from manufacturing prac-
tices were unintentional even though caused by acts that were intentional)).
66. See id at 1251.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1252.
69. IA at 1253.
70. Id The president of the Insurance Company of North America (INA) stated that
only accidental pollution was covered (e.g. equipment breakdown) and insurers
[n]o longer [will] insure the company which knowingly dumps its wastes. In our
opinion, such repeated actions--especially in violation of specific laws-are not
insurable exposures .... We at INA hope that our anti-pollution exclusion may
help encourage many companies to take the first, crucial steps toward improving
their manufacturing process-the steps that will lead eventually to a cleaner,
healthier, and we hope, happier life for all.
Id. at 1253 n.82 (quoting a speech by Charles Cox, Liability Insurance in the Era of the Con-
sumer, Annual Conference of the American Society of Insurance Management (Apr. 9,
1970)).
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predecessors .... 71
When interpreting the pollution exclusion policies, courts were un-
certain as to how the CGL occurrence limitation integrated with the new
pollution exclusion and its exception. For example, the policy NH and
Industrial issued to Hecla limited the scope of coverage by excluding
pollution damages as follows:
This insurance does not apply . . to bodily injury or property dam-
age arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, li-
quids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants,
pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water
course or body of water .... 72
The policy also contained an exception to the pollution exclusion, which
allowed coverage for pollution in certain circumstances as follows: "....
but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape
is sudden and accidental .... ,,73
1. The Exclusion Excludes Nothing
Regarding this form of exclusionary clause, courts basically held the
pollution exclusion clause to be coextensive with the occurrence limita-
tion and interpreted "sudden and accidental" to mean unintended and
unexpected. This made the exception redundant and the exclusion in-
distinguishable from the coverage. Courts also defined "sudden" in
terms of the expectation element of accident, rather than focusing on its
temporal significance. For example, in Jackson Township Municipal Utilities
Authority v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 74 the court held the seepage
of pollutants into an aquifer was "sudden and accidental" no matter how
many discharges occurred and even though they "may have been grad-
ual rather than sudden." 75 Other courts held the exception applied if
the pollution was either sudden or accidental, against the clear language
of the clause. Thus, the accident language used in these clauses trig-
gered coverage in almost any situation. By 1986, courts held pollution
exclusion clauses were ambiguous 76 and did not exclude passive pollu-
71. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1253.
72. Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Colo.
1991)(emphasis in original).
73. Id. at 1086-87 (emphasis in original).
74. 451 A.2d 990 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
75. Id. at 994. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (App. Div.
1980) (although not instantaneous, leak from negligently installed gas tank was
"sudden").
76. Many courts that denied summary judgment left resolution of the ambiguity issue
for juries to determine whether the pollution was excluded from coverage based on the
facts (not pleadings). See, e.g., Riehl v. Travelers Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1985) (issue
of fact whether insured had knowledge of toxics on his property); City of Northglenn v.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 217 (D. Colo. 1986) (genuine issue of fact whether
service station seepage was covered); State of Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 647 F. Supp. 1064
(D. Idaho 1986) (genuine issue whether pollution damage was an "occurrence"); CPS
Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 886 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (genuine
issue whether harm was intentional or inadvertent); A-I Sandblasting & Steamcleaning
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tion or gradual pollution occurring over twenty years or less.7 7 With
few exceptions, 78 courts ruled in favor of the insureds79 and made the
pollution exclusion clause "essentially superfluous by way of judicial
merger into the occurrence clause." 80
Co. v. Baiden, 632 P.2d 1377 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (issue of fact whether oversprayed paint
was a "liquid" within policy's pollution exclusion clause), aff'd, 643 P.2d 1260 (Or. 1982).
77. See R. Stephen Burke, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: The Agony, the Ecstasy, and the Irony
for Insurance Companies, 17 N. Ky. L. REv. 443, 455 (1990).
78. Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir.
1984) (pollution from regular business activity was excluded); Grant-Southern Iron &
Metal Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., 669 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (continuous plant emis-
sions were excluded), rev'd, 905 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1990); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (pollution from chemicals drained during
regular business operations excluded); American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
587 F. Supp. 1549 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (continuous toxic waste dumping excluded); Healy
Tibbitts Constr. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 482 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (pollution
from sinking oil barge excluded from coverage); Barmet of Indiana, Inc. v. Security Ins.
Group, 425 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (damages from discharges which decreased
visibility causing car accident excluded); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 711 P.2d 212
(Or. Ct. App. 1985) (acid discharges which were part of business practice excluded).
79. FEDERAL COURTS:
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1985) (insurance
policy covers fire damages and contamination claims); National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Continental Casualty Ins. Co., 650 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (inspections did not
detect pollution problem, therefore, damages were not "sudden and accidental"); Payne v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 625 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (lack of control over
release of PCBs and denying EPA access to company property was not enough to find
intentional harm); Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D. Md. 1978) (pulp mill
pollution included in coverage).
STATE COURTS:
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Armstrong, 479 So. 2d 1164 (Ala. 1985) (sewage
overflows from construction were not excluded); Molten, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95 (Ala. 1977) (sand and dirt not excluded); Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220 (Me. 1980) (duty to defend against class action
lawsuit exists where there is no allegation that the damages were "sudden and acciden-
tal"); Shapiro v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 477 N.E.2d 146 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (dam-
ages from fuel tank leak covered);Jonesville Prods., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 402
N.W.2d 46 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (though discharge of chemical was continuous, com-
plaint did not allege it was expected or intended, thus, insurers had a duty to defend);
Industrial Steel Container Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 399 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (long term contaminant leakage qualifies as an "accident"); General Ins. Co. of
America v. Town Pump, Inc., 692 P.2d 427 (Mont. 1984) (underground gas tank leak was
not intended, therefore, insurer could not prevail on summary judgment alleging that it
had no duty to defend or pay); Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (long-time pollution damage at
landfill was not expected or intended); Autotronic Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 456
N.Y.S.2d 504 (App. Div. 1982) (insurer had duty to defend gas station designer as the
designer was not the active polluter); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 426 N.Y.S.2d 603
(App. Div. 1980) (seepage from storage tanks was "sudden and accidental"); Niagara
County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Misc. 2d 814 (Sup. Ct. Niagra County 1980), aff'd, 439
N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1981) (county charged with negligence for longtime toxic chemi-
cal dumping at Love Canal area); Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bagley, 409 N.Y.S.2d 294
(App. Div. 1978) (chemical spraying pollution was unintended); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v.
Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 477 N.E.2d 1227 (Ohio'Ct. App. 1984) (even if chemical
leaks were part of regular business practice, insurer had duty to defend); United Pac. Ins.
Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 664 P.2d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (underground
gasoline leaks were unexpected and unintended).
80. Burke, supra note 77, at 455.
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2. The Pollution Exclusion Works
In 1986, insurers prevailed when a state supreme court held the
pollution exclusion clause was unambiguous. In Waste Management of
Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Insurance Co.,81 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held pollution damages from Waste Management's dumping of
contaminating substances into groundwater fell within the exclusion
clause, the "sudden and accidental" exception was inapplicable and
therefore the insurers had no duty to defend. The "sudden and acci-
dental" exception applied to the moment of pollutant release, whereas
the exclusion itself described the discharge, omission and polluting re-
lease into air, water or land.
The court held that an appropriate subject for summary judgment
was the issue of whether facts alleged in the complaint were covered in
the policies. The court also noted the duty to defend was broader than
the duty indemnify. 82 While the duty to defend is ordinarilly measured
by facts in the pleadings85 and the duty to pay is measured by facts de-
termined at trial,8 4 the acceptance of modem notice pleadings imposes
another duty on insurers. This duty, "to investigate and evaluate facts
expressed or implied in the third-party complaint[s]," 85 could poten-
tially relieve insurers of their duty to defend if facts are not arguably
within the policy coverage. However, they may otherwise have a duty to
defend the insured against groundless or baseless claims.8 6 In Waste
Management, the complaint alleged that (1) certain negligent acts con-
tributed to contamination of the aquifer, (2) did not allege the acts were
sudden and accidental, and (3) suggested seepage into the aquifer was
gradual.8 7 The deposition of a Waste Management employee describ-
ing the trash removal process suggested the dumping was both intended
and expected.
8 8
The court felt that, although it was possible to find ambiguity in the
policy, "it strains at logic to do so."'8 9 The exclusion narrowed the "lim-
itless class of events" that could be interpreted as occurrences to
"nonpolluting events or polluting events that occur 'suddenly and acci-
dentally.' "90 The court found the focus of the occurrence language was
intention and expectation, but the pollution exclusion was concerned
more with the nature of the loss than the act.9 1 The court stated:
81. 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986).
82. Id. at 377.
83. Id.
84. Id. The court recognized, however, that there is a duty to defend if the pleadings
state facts showing the alleged injury is covered by the policy, regardless of whether the
insured is ultimately liable. Id. (citing Strickland v. Hughes, 160 S.E.2d 313, 318 (N.C.
1968)).
85. Id. at 378.
86. Id. (citing 14 CoUcH ON INSURANCE 2d § 51:46 (rev. ed. 1982)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 379.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 380-81.
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"When courts consider the release alone to be the key to the pollution
exclusion clause, the sudden and accidental exception can be boot-
strapped onto almost any allegations that do not specify a gradual re-
lease or emission."' 92 Such a construction of the clause is "so restrictive
as to vitiate the 'sudden and accidental' exception."
9 3
The court also pointed out "obvious" policy reasons for the pollu-
tion exclusion clause: "[I]f an insured knows that liability incurred by all
manner of negligent or careless spills and releases is covered by his lia-
bility policy, he is tempted to diminish his precautions and relax his vigi-
lance. . . .In this case, it pays the insured to keep his head in the
sand." 94 The court noted that putting financial responsibility for pollu-
tion back onto the insured, rather than the insurance company, places
responsibility to protect against such pollution "upon the party with the
most control over the circumstances most likely to cause the
pollution." 95
The Waste Management court's rejection of ambiguity of the pollution
exclusion clause seems to have had some affect on the state courts,
96




96.' Between 1987 and 1990, more state courts ruled in favor of insurance companies,
holding that pollution was excluded from coverage. See, e.g., Hicks v. American Resources
Ins. Co., 544 So. 2d 952 (Ala. 1989) (seepage and runoff of contaminated water from strip
mine pit was expressly excluded); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Heda Mining Co., 791 P.2d
1154 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (Colorado mining act provides notice that mining company
knew or should have known that pollution from its operations would occur), reo'd, Hecla
Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991); Perkins Hardwood
Lumber Co. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 378 S.E.2d 407 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (no duty to
defend against negligence claim caused by wood fire smoke); International Minerals &
Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d 758 (Il1. App. Ct. 1988) (waste dumping
which continued for three years excluded); Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. American Home
Assurance Co., 542 N.E.2d 1048 (N.Y. 1989), aff'g 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (App. Div. 1988)
(long-term discharge of chemicals into a creek was not "sudden and accidental," even
though it may have been lawful); County of Broome v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 540
N.Y.S.2d 620 (App. Div. 1989) (fourteen years of dumping at a landfill which had repeated
leachate and pollution problems was excluded); Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co.,
533 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (App. Div. 1988) (company uncovered hazards buried years ago, but
exclusion applies because former owner polluted knowingly and intentionally); Lower Pax-
ton Township v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 557 A.2d 393 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(methane escape from a landfill was not an abrupt discharge); Just v. Land Reclamation,
Ltd., 445 N.W.2d 683 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (coverage excluded for continuous debris and
waste pollution from a landfill); State v. Mauthe, 419 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)
(repeated chromic acid leaks over sixteen years not covered by policy), rev'd, 456 N.W.2d
570 (Wis. 1990).
Many state courts, however, continued to hold the phrase "sudden and accidental"
ambiguous, thus nullifying the effect of the exclusion. See, e.g., Claussen v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989) ("sudden" has several reasonable meanings);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 535 N.E.2d 1071 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1989) (ambiguous regarding whether manufacturer expected or intended illegal
dumping); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)
(toxic waste leaks occurring over three weeks from holes in tanks were unexpected and
unintended, thus "sudden"); Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (installation of building materials which leaked toxic chemicals was
negligent but not excluded); Industrial Steel Container Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
399 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (continuous contamination at a landfill was an
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while federal courts97 have generally adopted the analysis. Adding fur-
ther to the controversy, however, some courts that hold the pollution
exclusion clause is ambiguous, also hold it is a genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether the particular pollution falls within the exclusion
clause or its exception.98 Therefore, the issue of coverage under a pol-
lution exclusion clause is an inappropriate subject for summary judg-
ment because a jury should decide material facts.
IV. HECLA MINING Co. . NEw HAMPSHIRE INSuRANCE Co.
A. Facts
Colorado filed a CERCLA complaint alleging strict liability and
common law negligence claims against Asarco, Resurrection Mining Co.
and the Res-Asarco Joint Venture (defendants) for cleanup costs and
other damages resulting from contaminating discharges from the Yak
"accident" and may be covered); Summit Assocs. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 550 A.2d
1235 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (damages from sludge pit unknown to developer
when property was purchased were covered); Kipin Indus. v. American Universal Ins. Co.,
535 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (release of chemicals was not excluded as it was
unexpected).
97. See, e.g., Alcolac, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1541 (D. Md.
1989) (repeated releases of chemicals was not "sudden and accidental"); C.L. Hauthaway
& Sons Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 712 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1989) (slow and
gradual discharge from underground pipe excluded); American Universal Ins. Co. v.
Whitewood Custom Treaters, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1140 (D.S.D. 1989) (damages caused by
failure to clean up "sudden and accidental" chemical discharges was not covered); Hayes
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513 (N.D. Fla. 1988) (dry-cleaning sludge was
placed purposely on property for a number of years was not covered); Guilford Indus. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 688 F. Supp. 792 (D. Me. 1988) (damages from ruptured pipes
excluded); State of New York v. Amro Realty Corp., 697 F. Supp. 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1988)
(damages from solvents released over 20 years into drains were excluded); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 693 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), aff'd,
875 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1989) (chemical releases occurring over six years at a landfill ex-
cluded from coverage); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 F. Supp.
1423 (D. Kan. 1987) (75 years of careless pollution at salt plant was excluded); Borden,
Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 865 F.2d 1267 (6th
Cir. 1989) (continuous radioactive waste dumping excluded), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816
(1990); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 677 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa.
1987) (continuous toxic waste disposal excluded); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Neville
Chem. Co., 650 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (continued groundwater pollution after
company was put on notice excluded).
Like the state courts, the federal courts were not unified in their rejection of ambigu-
ity. Many federal courts also continued to interpret policies in ways which nullified the
effect of the exclusion clause. See, e.g., City ofJohnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877
F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989) (city was on notice that landfill leaked when it purchased policy,
however, absent evidence of intent or knowledge that damage would flow from its acts,
coverage was not excluded); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp.
1171 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (insurance company waives "sudden and accidental" defense by
agreeing to provide coverage for damages); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Del. 1988) (landfill leakage was expected yet covered
under policy); Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F.
Supp. 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (PCBs release into aquifer was not a natural result, however,
damage was covered); Township of Gloucester v. Maryland Casualty Co., 668 F. Supp. 394
(D.N.J. 1987) (seepage from landfill was not excluded, even though state complaint al-
leged the township knew or should have known of pollution).
98. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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Tunnel into the California Gulch just outside of Leadville.9 9 The min-
ing tunnels were apparently improperly maintained, which caused rock
and timber to collapse, debris barriers to form and impounded water to
seep into the tunnel.10 0 During removal of debris from the polluted
water, a yellow sedimentary sludge surged from the Yak Tunnel and
contaminated the California Gulch drainage basin with limonitic precipi-
tate,, turning a twenty-mile stretch of the Arkansas River orange.
10 '
A third-party complaint by defendants against Hecla alleged the
mining company discharged hazardous substances into the tunnel from
1938 to 1983.102 Since NH and Industrial insured Hecla from 1974
through 1985, Hecla asked both companies to defend the lawsuit.'
0 3
The insurance policies provided defense and liability coverage for dam-
age resulting from unexpected and unintended occurrences. Nonethe-
less, pollution damages were not covered because the policies contained
pollution exclusion clauses. Therefore, the insurance policies covered
only sudden and accidental pollution. 10 4 The insurance companies ar-
gued the California Gulch contamination was reasonably foreseeable
and, thus, not covered under the policies because the pollution was ex-
pected and not an "occurrence."' 1 5 In the alternative, they argued,
even if the pollution was unexpected and unintended, the discharge oc-
curred over a long period of time, so the pollution was not "sudden and
accidental" and thus they did not have a duty to defend Hecla against
the state's CERCLA claims."'
0 6
B. Procedural History
When Hecla was joined as a third-party in the complaint and re-
quested the insurers to defend, Industrial denied coverage and filed for
declaratory judgment 10 7 to determine whether it had a duty to defend
and indemnify10 8 Hecla under the policies. NH subsequently inter-
vened in the declaratory judgment action.' 0 9 Helca refused to proceed
with discovery in the declaratory judgment action and prevailed on both
its Motion for Protective Order and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel. Hecla then moved for summary judgment." 10 Hecla's success
in evading discovery meant the court had only the facts alleged in the
pleadings with which to determine summary judgment. Although Hecla
99. Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Colo. 1991).
100. Id. at 1085 n.3.
101. Id. at 1085.
102. Id. at 1085-86.
103. Id. at 1086.
104. Id. at 1086-87.
105. Id. at 1087.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1086. Declaratory judgment actions to determine preliminary matters, such
as insurance coverage and the duty to defend, are authorized by COLO. R. Cxv. P. 57;
CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 13-151-101 to 115 (1987).
108. Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1086. The focus of this Note is on the duty to defend. A de-
tailed discussion of the duty to indemnify is beyond the scope of this Note.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1095.
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admitted regular hazardous discharges occurred in its usual mining op-
erations, it argued this was an "occurrence" because the resulting dam-
age was unintended. 1  The District Court held for Hecla finding both
NH and Industrial had a duty to defend in the CERCLA action, but the
duty to indemnify was not ripe for resolution."
12
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed and held Hecla knew or
should have known of a substantial probability that its mining activities
would result in environmental damage. 1 3 Therefore, the California
Gulch contamination was not an occurrence because an " 'occurrence' is
an event whose results are both unintended and unexpected."1 4 The
pollution damages can not be unexpected "if they are the ordinary con-
sequences of those acts." 15 The court held the Colorado Mined Land
Reclamation Act (Act) provided constructive notice to Hecla, and other
mining operators, that mining activities "could cause environmental
damage."' 16 This holding precluded the mining companies from as-
serting the defense that they did not intend pollution damages to result
from mining.
The court noted the purpose of the Act was to "aid in the protec-
tion of wildlife and aquatic resources.., and promote the health, safety
and welfare of the people of this state."' 17 The Act, one of two statutes
which regulate mining in Colorado, 1 8 applies to mining and prospect-
ing operations for all minerals and regulates 1 9 land use for mine loca-
tion and related "environmental and socioeconomic impacts"' 20 by
requiring that prospecting notices, 12 1 financial warranties 122 and recla-
mation permits 123 be filed before prospecting. 124 The court of appeals
111. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Heca Mining Co., 791 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1989), rev'd, 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991).
112. Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1086.
113. New Hampshire, 791 P.2d at 1157.
114. Id. at 1156.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1157.
117. Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-32-101 (1984)).
118. See supra note 2. Minerals include oil shale, sand, soil and gravel, but exclude oil
and gas. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-32-103(7) (1984).
119. With the Department of Natural Resources, the Division of Mined Land Reclama-
tion administers the Act and its regulations. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 407-1 (1990).
120. See C & M Sand & Gravel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 673 P.2d 1013, 1017
(Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (interpreting the Act as allowing local regulation, by permit, of some
aspects of land use for mining). Certain restrictions apply to mining operations within
national parks, wildlife habitats, trails, scenic rivers or wilderness preservation systems and
recreation areas or facilities. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-32-110(2); 2 COLO. CODE REGS.
407-1 § 3.2.
121. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-32-113(1) (Supp. 1991).
122. Id. § 34-32-113(4).
123. Id. § 34-32-109(1). Mining operations are any "development or extraction of a
mineral from its natural occurrences on affected land." Id. § 34-32-103(8). Mining opera-
tions encompass processing, transporting and disposal of wastes from underground min-
ing. Id.
124. Prospecting is the search for or investigation of a mineral deposit and includes
building access roads, easements or other facilities that may cause a greater disturbance to
land than "ordinary lawful use... by persons not prospecting." Id. § 34-32-103(12). If
the notice and warranty requirements are met, the Board notifies the prospectors of addi-
tional requirements for land reclamation, inspects the land and releases the financial war-
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reasoned the Act's extensive environmental standards and restrictions,
as well as the Act's legislative declaration to protect wildlife and aquatic
resources, gave notice to mining operators that their activities could
cause environmental damage.
C. Majority Opinion
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
CGLs with pollution exclusion clauses require insurers to defend CER-
CLA actions for pollution damages resulting from mining activities.
Before construing the "sudden and accidental" language of the pollu-
tion exclusion clause, the court first noted an insurer's broad duty to
defend. CGLs impose two distinct duties on insurance companies-the
duty to defend a lawsuit that falls within the policy language and the
duty to indemnify. 12 5 The duty to defend "is an area of significant dis-
pute"'126 due to the growing potential liability imposed by environmen-
tal statutes and the significant defense costs incurred in defending
claims.
How this defense duty arises is another hotly debated issue. The
duty to defend is usually established in one of two ways-either by look-
ing at the four comers of the complaint or by evaluating extrinsic facts
beyond the allegations of the complaint.' 27 Under the four comers test
adopted by the Hecla court, an insurer has a duty to defend if, on its face,
the underlying complaint states any claim that may potentially be cov-
ered under the policy. 12 8 Therefore, if an insurer can show the com-
plaint unambiguously excludes coverage, then there is no duty to
defend. 129 Insurers also have a duty to investigate facts that might show
probable liability before denying its duty to defend.13 0 Whether these
extrinsic facts, elicited in the investigation, can be used to determine the
duty to defend is questionable.13 1 Some jurisdictions allow use of fac-
tual evidence extrinsic to the complaint's allegations when determining
the duty to defend.13 2 In Colorado, before the Hecla decision, insurers
ranty when there is an acceptable reclamation. Id. § 34-32-113(5). All applications for
reclamation permits must meet stringent standards, such as criteria for minimized distress
to water systems and protection of ditches and gutters from pollution. See 2 COLO. CODE
REGS. 407-1 Rule 6; COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-32-116. The Board is authorized, along with
the Colorado Bureau of Mines, to inspect reclaimed lands and prospecting activities to
assure compliance with the Act. Id.
125. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1241 n.20.
126. Michael D. Glatt & Lawrence Hobel, Liability Insurance Disputes, in Commercial Law
and Practice Course Handbook Series: Techniques of Self Insurance, 400 PRAcT. L. INsT. 343
(1986).
127. Stewart McNab, The Duty to Defend in Colorado After Hecla Mining, 20 COLO. LAW.
2095 (1991).
128. Glatt & Hobel, supra note 126, at 345 (citing C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. American
Home Assurance Co., 640 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1981).
129. Id. (citing Bandy v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 458 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1972).
130. Id. (citing Fresno Economy Import Used Cars, Inc. v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 142 Cal. Rptr. 681 (Ct. App. 1977)).
131. Id. (citing Green Bus Lines v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.Y.S.2d 981, 987
(App. Div. 1980)).
132. Randy Mott et. al. Hazardous Waste Claims Under Comprehensive General Liability Poli-
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could proceed with discovery of extrinsic facts during a declaratory
judgment action. Whether these facts could be used to establish the
duty to defend was previously within the discretion of the trial court.'
33
The Hecla court's adoption of the four comers test precludes the trial
court from considering extrinsic facts.
The Hecla court held the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify
are separate and distinct.' 34 Avoiding the duty to defend is a heavy bur-
den because the duty arises whenever facts alleged in the underlying
complaint arguably fall within coverage, which if sustained would im-
pose liability. The court introduced a new twist of procedure in Colo-
rado insurance law-insurers seeking to avoid the duty to defend in suits
involving intentional pollution damages, which would be excluded from
coverage under the insurance policies, should not seek a declaratory
judgment decision before the trial of the underlying claim. Insurers risk
losing a summary judgment action if they proceed with a declaratory
judgment claim before facts are discovered extrinsic to the complaint.
Formerly, Colorado insurance law allowed declaratory judgment pro-
ceedings and discovery of extrinsic facts simultaneous with the underly-
ing claim. The Hecla court deviated from this practice and granted
summary judgment to Hecla based on this new procedure.
Finally, the court, while interpreting the contract language, noted
that principles of contract law require ambiguous language to be con-
strued against the party who drafted the agreement, here, NH and In-
dustrial. The court held the pollution exclusion language did not
exclude anything that was "unexpected and unintended." The Califor-
nia Gulch contaminating surge was an "occurrence" covered under the
policies because the CERCLA complaint did not allege either Hecla ex-
pected or intended the environmental damage or that the damage would
flow directly and immediately from its mining operations.13 5 The court's
construction of the contract language provided coverage for pollution
damages that were "unexpected and unintended" occurrences, unless
Hecla knew the pollution damages would result and they were not "sud-
den and accidental." Under the "sudden and accidental exception," the
court held that if the pollution could have occurred suddenly and acci-
dentally, then the insurer must defend. Because the words "sudden and
accidental" in the exception were not defined in Hecla's policies, the
court interpreted them.
The court undertook a complex analysis of the possible meanings of
"sudden and accidental" with relevant case law and concluded "sud-
den" could describe either the unexpectedness of the event or its dura-
des, in Litigation and Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series: Litigation - Hazardous Waste
Litigation 1986, 301 PRAcT. L. INST. 149 (1986) (citing Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d
168 (Ca. 1966)).
133. See Troelstrup v. District Ct., 712 P.2d 1010 (Colo. 1986); Hartford Ins. Group v.
District Ct., 625 P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1981).
134. Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1086 n.5.
135. In a CERCLA action, a strict liability claim, the plaintiff does not need to allege
the environmental damages are actually intended and expected.
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tion and, therefore, the word was ambiguous. The court held the
sudden and accidental exception allowed coverage unless Hecla knew
the damages would flow directly from its intentional actions. The poli-
cies' pollution exclusion clauses for cleanup and damage caused by pol-
lution were inapplicable to the duty to defend Hecla in the CERCLA
action because the CERCLA strict liability claim purportedly did not al-
lege intentional or expected acts.
The court of appeal's policy interpretation of the Act put mining
companies in the precarious position of having no defense against liabil-
ity for future intentional pollution damages by virtue of constructive no-
tice under the Act. The supreme court's decision was influenced by the
need to reverse this interpretation of the Act. The court held the Act
did not provide notice to mining companies, as a matter of law, that
their activities could cause environmental damage, which would pre-
clude them from recovery under insurance policies. Thus, the court
proclaimed mining a necessary and proper activity and forced insurers
to defend against CERCLA claims. The Hecla court sought to promote
continued development of the mining industry, rather than protect wild-
life and aquatic resources from mining pollution as the court of appeals




The dissent would not have granted summary judgment until more
facts were elicited in discovery. The duty to defend under the pollution
exclusion clause would have been determined either when discovery was
complete or in a subsequent action after the trial of the underlying
claim. Rather than mandate this choice as in the majority opinion, the
dissent would have allowed discretion to look beyond the allegations of
the complaint when defining the duty. The trial judge would then have
discretion to hold the declaratory judgment action in abeyance until res-
olution of the underlying claim. Insurance companies could defend
under a reservation of rights and later seek reimbursement for costs
along with the determination of their duties to defend.
The dissent considered the duty to defend a "fact specific" case-by-
case determination. The dissent detailed several rationales and pro-
vided extensive authority for looking beyond allegations in the underly-
ing complaint in order to determine the, duty to defend. First, the
dissent noted that it is inappropriate to determine an insurer's duty to
defend based solely on allegations in a CERCLA complaint since the
state does not need to allege either a party intended or expected to pol-
lute or that the discharges were sudden and accidental. Second, in
Hecla's case, there was strong reason to believe facts would be elicited
during discovery that would exclude the pollution damages from cover-
age because some allegations inferred intentional behavior on Hecla's
136. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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part. Third, any party with ownership interests in the contaminated site
could be held strictly liable, regardless of fault or intent, yet intent was
important to the pollution damage coverage issue. In a CERCLA com-
plaint, whether the pollution damage is "unexpected and unintended"
or "sudden and accidental" is immaterial. Therefore, the complaint al-
legations do not resolve the material issue of fact regarding coverage
under the pollution exclusion clause. The dissent found summary judg-
ment should not have been granted until issues of fact regarding cover-
age were resolved.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Hecla's Procedural Deviation
The primary points of contention in Hecla's motion for summary
judgment were the scope of the policy coverage and the duty to defend
under the policy. The resolution of the issues in Hecla's motion for
summary judgment involved: (1) construing the contract language (the
occurrence limitation, the pollution exclusion clause and its exception);
(2) determining whether events alleged in the complaint, or other facts
discovered, were covered under the policies; and (3) establishing the
duty to defend a CERCLA lawsuit based on undisputed facts. In making
its decision, the Hecla court departed from established Colorado prece-
dent,13 7 which previously allowed insurance companies to seek a deter-
mination of factual issues regarding coverage in a declaratory judgment
action before defending the underlying liability claim. When the court
granted Hecla's motion for summary judgment, it denied the insurers an
opportunity to show coverage did not exist. Further, the court based its
summary judgment decision on the allegations in the complaint, rather
than undisputed facts.
Deciding policy coverage and insurers' duties under policy exclu-
sions may not be an appropriate subject for summary judgment. In
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Colorado National Bank of Denver,
1 3 8
Judge Weinshienk advised there was a genuine issue of fact whether the
events fell under the pollution exclusion clause. Relying on City of North-
glenn v. Chevron U.S.A., the court asked "[d]id the word 'accident' mean
something different than 'occurrence'? Is it an accident whether pollu-
tants in a pond leak out and pollute the ground waters of the state of
Colorado?"1 39 The court concluded that "accident" should not be
given a "very narrow technical definition" as a matter of law. A jury
should construe the words "sudden and accidental" in determining
whether the factual events fell within the exclusion or its exception.
In Hecla, the dissent expressed similiar sentiments regarding the
need to gather facts before deciding the material issues in the summary
137. Troelstrup, 712 P.2d at 1012.
138. No. 86-Z-1033 (D. Colo. filed Nov. 4, 1988) (unreported).
139. Id.; see also City of Northglenn v. Chevron, U.S.A., 634 F. Supp. 217 (D. Colo.
1986).
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judgment action. 140 Even the court in Waste Management, which decided
the coverage issue as a matter of law, ruled for the insurance company
because facts produced in discovery showed the pollution damages were
intended. This evidence, elicited in deposition testimony of a Waste
Management employee, greatly influenced the court.
Learning the lesson from Waste Management, however, Hecla in-
creased its potential for summary judgment by strategically avoiding dis-
covery, which might have elicited facts showing Hecla's acts fell outside
coverage. Instead, Hecla avoided the coverage issue by seeking a deter-
mination only on the duty to defend, based on allegations and not facts.
Since the mining company prevailed on the defense issue only, the in-
surance company could, presumably, seek a judgment on the coverage
issue later, after a substantial outlay of costs defending Hecla against the
CERCLA claim. Insurers may still litigate coverage issues against in-
sureds, but only in declaratory judgment actions subsequent to resolu-
tion of underlying suits.
NH and Industrial sought a factual determination of both issues-
coverage and duty to defend-because they understood the duty to de-
fend coexisted with the duty to indemnify. The Hecla court held that
only the duty to pay is a question of fact and the duty to defend could be
decided as a matter of law. Thus, insurers with no obligation to pay still
have a duty to defend. However, insurers may do so under a reservation
of rights, and later seek reimbursement for defense costs, if coverage is
ultimately denied.
This procedure forces insurers into an ineffective and unproductive
"wait-and-see" perspective. They cannot file a declaratory judgment ac-
tion unless the facts alleged show that no coverage existed. The in-
sureds will be granted a defense, even though their intentional actions
may be excluded from coverage. Even if facts outside the complaint
show pollution damages were intentional and therefore excluded from
coverage, insurers may still have to defend and later seek reimburse-
ment if those same facts are not alleged in the complaint.
This procedure is inefficient for both insurer and insured. 14 1 In-
sureds still risk being sued by insurers for reimbursement of defense
costs should they ultimately lose the declaratory judgment action after
trial. Rather than proceed with discovery in the earlier declaratory judg-
ment action, the parties expend time, money and resources (both theirs
and the state attorney general's prosecuting the underlying environmen-
tal damage claim) until facts demonstrate how the pollution was caused
and whether it is excluded from coverage. The procedure also discour-
140. See Heda, 811 P.2d at 1092-93 (Mullarkey,J., dissenting). This isa position shared
by many other courts. See, e.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 946
F.2d 1489, 1490 (10th Cir. 1991) (in deciding whether a duty to defend exists, a court may
look to allegations in the complaint and at any facts that the insurer reasonably could
discover); Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 32
(1st Cir. 1984) (court may review independant evidence in a determination of duty to de-
fend "if the complaint ... does not on its face establish lack of coverage.").
141. See McNab, supra note 127, at 2096.
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ages settlements, which might be in an insured's best interest, because
of the insurer's interest in issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel
for its subsequent action against the insured.
14 2
B. Hecla's Contract Construction
The court held the contaminating surge was an occurrence under
the CGL. Moreover, the insurers had a duty to defend because the
CERCLA complaint asserted strict liability and did not assert that the
insured expected or intended the damages to result from its mining ac-
tivities. The occurrence limitation in Hecla's policies, merging with the
"sudden and accidental" language, excluded only damages that the in-
sured knew would flow directly and immediately from its intentional act.
The "sudden and accidental" language could have been a turning
point for the court. A reliable construction goes "beyond semantics"
because: "[O]ccurrence relates to the anticipation of an event-
whether or not it was intentional or expected. The pollution exclusion
... describes the event-not only in terms of its being unexpected, but
in terms of its happening instantaneously or precipitously."' 43 With
this guideline, pollution damage can be correctly categorized. In the
Hecla dispute, the occurrence was the anticipated event, Hecla's continu-
ous and repeated discharges into the tunnel, whether those discharges
were intended or expected. Under the pollution exclusion clause, the
liability for the contaminating pollution caused by the surge is excluded
from coverage. The exception allows for coverage only if the event that
caused the pollution damage is both "sudden and accidental."
For example, an occurrence might be the transportation of hazard-
ous substances across town, the damage might be pollution emissions
from a leak in the truck. Although the transporting of hazardous sub-
stances can be continuous and damages from such may be covered, pol-
lution liability resulting from a leak will be excluded if not sudden and
accidental. Depending on how the leak occurred, the pollution damages
may or may not be covered by the insurance policy. Leaks occurring
from improperly sealed tanks may not be covered, but leaks that eventu-
ally result from weak sealants may be. A factual determination should
be made as to whether the resulting pollution is sudden and accidental
and whether there is coverage for that pollution.
NH and Industrial made a similar argument in Hecla. The insurers
argued the CGLs excluded coverage for pollution damage unless the
release of the pollutants was both sudden and accidental. The insurers
contended a common sense interpretation of the plain language of the
policy mandated that ongoing releases from mining operations for a to-
142. Part of the purpose of CERCLA is to increase settlements: "The fact that the stat-
ute is designed to foster settlements reduces further the chance that a determination of
intent, expectedness, suddeness or accidental nature of alleged damages or discharges
would be determined in the underlying CERCLA case." Heda, 811 P.2d at 1095 n.2 (Mul-
larkey, J. dissenting).
143. Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 382
(N.C. 1986).
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tal of ninety years "were emphatically not sudden."1 4 4 Despite this
common sense argument, Hecla contented that the insurers had a duty
to defend because the complaint allegations did not allege that Hecla
intended environmental harm. "Therefore, the District Court was cor-
rect in ruling there is a duty to defend by the insurers here since CER-
CLA is a strict liability statute and mere ownership property which in
some way contributes to environmental damage is sufficient for liability
under the statute."1 4 5 What this argument fails to consider is that
Hecla's liability under the statute is not at issue in the summary judg-
ment motion. What is at issue is the insurer's liability under the pollu-
tion exclusion clause. Hecla's argument-that the CERCLA complaint
did not allege Hecla's specific acts caused various hazardous substances
to be discharged into the Yak Tunnel, which "injured and destroyed nat-
ural resources" 14 6-does not resolve the factual question of whether the
pollution damage was covered in the insurance policies.
While Hecla contended the complaint showed no intentional acts,
the insurers contended the complaint showed that the releases of pollu-
tants were "the antithesis of 'sudden.' 147 Quoting the complaint, the
insureds asserted the pollutants were repeatedly and continuously re-
leased" 'into the environment, including surface waters, ground waters,
air and lands within the State of Colorado, beginning in approximately
1895 and continuing to the present.' "148 When emissions occur on a
regular basis or in the course of business, the sudden and accidental
exception should not apply. Although an occurrence is distinct and sud-
den, such an occurrence may not be accidental. If an accident keeps re-
curring, intent should be inferred.
14 9
Facts alleged in the Hecla complaint showed a contribution of con-
taminating materials into the tunnel over a period of over 15 years,
which eventually released into the California Gulch, making the water
hazardous for any human use. The plain terms of the policy exclusion
compared with the pleadings, which neither expressed or implied the
releases were sudden, showed the alleged occurrences may have re-
mained outside the policy coverage. Yet despite plain language in poli-
cies, courts still hold sudden and accidental exceptions can mean either
sudden or accidental and sudden can mean gradual. 150
"[C]ourts really hate polluters but they hate insurers even
144. Brief of Amicus Curiae Insurance Environmental Litigation Association, New
Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 791 P.2d 1154 (Colo Ct. App. 1989) (No.CA-87-
0092), rev'd, 811 P.2d at 1083 (Colo. 1991).
145. Answer Brief of Defendant-Appellee Hecla Mining Co. to Brief of Appellant New
Hampshire Ins. Co. at 8, New Hampshire Ins. Co. (No. CA-87-0092).
146. Reply Brief of Appellant Industrial Indemnity. Co. at 4-5, New Hampshire Ins. Co.
(No. CA-87-0092).
147. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 6.
148. Id. (quoting Amended Complaint at 14).
149. Great Lakes Container v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 1984)
(routine discharge that was part of a continuous negligent practice was not "sudden").
150. The court was persuaded by Hecla's "parade of horribles." See Petition for Certi-
orari at 11-12, Hecla (No. 89-SC-646).
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more.'151 Given this attitude towards insurance companies and the new
social policy to find a financially solvent party to fund environmental
cleanups, its hardly surprising courts continue to expand coverage when
interpreting insurance contracts in environmental litigation. However,
traditional insurance law disfavors insuring intentional or reckless be-
havior. In addition, the Hecla court's new procedure will not guarantee
that insurers will fund cleanups.
In Hecla, the court tipped the scales against the public's environ-
mental concerns. Viewed in economic terms the decision is of doubtful
value. It allows mining companies to further externalize pollution
cleanup costs, thereby encouraging the mining industry to pollute at a
greater level. It forces insurers to defend against possible intentional
pollution damages and provides no incentive for the mining companies
to stop polluting. It does not guarantee insurers will pay for cleanup
because the pollution damage may be excluded from coverage in a sub-
sequent declaratory judgment action. The literature on law and eco-
nomics reasons that societal wealth is maximized when financial
responsibility for resulting harm is placed on the party in the best posi-
tion to compare the benefits derived from the activity (mining) with the
costs required to prevent the harm (pollution) resulting from an activ-
ity. This is because the party who knows the risks can best evaluate and,
if efficient, avoid them. 152 Mining companies and other industrial pol-
luters did not win the battle in Hecla, which granted a broad duty to
defend, because the companies remain in the economic labyrinth cre-
ated by decisions that allow industry to avoid internalizing externalities.
Therefore, the Hecla holding does not really promote mining be-
cause the laws of economics dictate the same result-insureds will pay
today for cleanup, or tomorrow for high insurance and litigation costs.
Insurers will inevitably be forced to either abandon coverage for pollu-
tion altogether, increase premiums tremendously or provide coverage
only in states favorable to insurers. 153 The dearth of insurance cover-
age or the alternative exorbitant premiums for pollution damages will in
turn force perpetual industrial polluters to bear their own waste cleanup
costs. The companies may find that their concern for the environment
and incentives for environmental protection may increase as their insur-
ance and litigation costs increase.
In the meantime, courts unwittingly have created a new victim-the
151. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1240 n. 16. In keeping with this "favoritism toward
the insured," courts cite three rules which embody this principle. Id. First, insurers have
the burden to prove noncoverage. Id. (citing Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Albert Pipe &
Supply Co., 484 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). Second, ambiguity must be con-
strued in favor of insured, especially when exclusion clauses are involved. Id. (citing 13 J.
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw PRACTICE § 7401 (Berdal ed. 1962)). Third, the insurers must
defend the entire suit if a single allegation in the underlying complaint is covered in the
policy. Id. (citing 7C J. Appelman, supra § 4684).
152. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 150-52 (1970).
153. Insurance companies faced with choice of law decisions in a state with broad con-
struction precedents such as Colorado will insert into policies a clause that all litigation
take place in states without such precedents.
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environment. 154 State and federal government attacks on pollution will
be frustrated by the Hecla decision for two reasons. First, industrial pol-
luters now have a deep-pocket defender, whose interest in the subse-
quent declaratory judgment action may conflict with settlement of a
CERCLA claim. Second, governmental expenditure of state funds to
prosecute with hopes of having insurers pay for the environmental
cleanup does not guarantee insurers will ultimately pay because, under
the Hecla procedure, insurers may still be successful in the subsequent
declaratory action and policy coverage may be excluded.
VI. CONCLUSION: DOES THE BROAD DUTY TO DEFEND PROMOTE
EITHER THE PREVENTION OF POLLUTION OR THE MINING
INDUSTRY?
Intensified public awareness of hazardous industrial by-products led
Congress to enact strict environmental laws' 55 imposing financial liabil-
ity on polluters for damages. Industrial polluters, such as mining com-
panies, first sought relief from astronomical cleanup costs by claiming
pollution damages were covered under their CGL insurance policies.'
56
Insurers, responding to an onslaught of litigation 15 7 and catastrophic
liability, first denied coverage and argued cleanup costs were not "legal
damages" covered under the policies. 158 Although the issue is far from
resolved, judicial construction of insurance policy language has consist-
ently expanded coverage, compelling insurers to redraft policies or find
themselves liable for pollution they had not intended to insure. When
insurers endeavored to expressly limit liability with pollution exclusion
clauses, courts were flooded with more litigation. Rather than take steps
to prevent future pollution damages, industry tried to escape direct re-
sponsibility for environmental damages by again seeking judicial expan-
154. Rosenkranz, supra note 34, at 1240.
155. Christine F. Ericson, Comment, Excluding the Pollution Exclusion: City of Johnstown,
New York v. Bankers Standard Insurance Co., 38 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMp. L. 287 n.1
(1990) (citing David Sive, Forward- Roles and Rules in Environmental Decisionmaking, 62 IowA
L. REv. 637 (1977) (describing environmental interests groups established to effect policy
changes)).
156. For a detailed analysis of the litigation in this area, see Hourihan, supra note 64.
For a brief overview see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
157. Today there are literally hundreds of these claims. The following are exam-
ples demonstrating the proportions of the litigation explosion: the Shell Oil
Company is suing 250 of its insurers, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation and
one of its subsidiaries is suing more than 140 of its insurers, Allied Signal Incor-
porated is suing 120 of its insurers, the Union Carbide Corporation is suing 115
of its insurers, and the Diamond Shamrock Chemical Corporation is suing 100 of
its insurers.
Pochop, supra note 21, at 300 n.10 (citing Diamond, The $700 Billion Cleaning Bill; Haz-
ardous Waste Sites, 1 INs. REv. 30 (1989)).
158. The drafters of both insurance policies and environmental statutes and regu-
lations believed that their product would best serve the needs of society in deal-
ing with the risks of doing business and protecting the environment. The
resulting collision in assessing liability for environmental damages has proven
bitter and controversial. The determination of liability for environmental dam-
ages to real property is one of the greatest controversies facing industry and the
judiciary in the past decade.
Meridan, supra note 27, at 30A-1 to 30A-2.
280 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:2
sion of coverage. The resulting collision course has generated pollution
litigation as ubiquitous as the pollution itself. As long as the mining
industry continues to externalize pollution liability costs, it remains both
economically and environmentally inefficient. This is especially true
under the new Hecla procedure because there is no guarantee that the
insurers will fund cleanup. The mining industry may eventually spread
the risk of pollution liability to the public through an increase in insur-
ance premium costs. However, by casting the allocation of environmen-
tal cleanup costs back onto the insurance contract bargaining table, the
Hecla decision forces insurers to further clarify intent when drafting in-
surance policies, rather than leaving courts to interpret contract exclu-
sionary language.
Diana A. Cachey
